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INTRODUCTION 
As a general rule in company law, the business of the company is conducted based 
on the votes of the majority of shareholders in that company. In certain instances 
however, the majority might take decisions that are detrimental to the minority 
shareholders of the company and therefore it is imperative that any company 
legislation has significant protective measures for minority shareholders in place. 
3 
This paper will discuss the concept of minority shareholder protection. This paper will 
do a comparative study between the shareholder appraisal regimes in the United 
States, Canada and South Africa. Since appraisal rights do not exist in Swaziland, a 
comparative study of minority shareholder protection in the United Kingdom will also 
be undertaken because Swaziland was colonised by the British and as such most of 
its law is rooted in English Law. It is from this lens that this paper will then examine 
minority shareholder protection in Swaziland. 
The research question addressed by this dissertation is two-fold. The first part of the 
question analyses the current measures in place for minority shareholder protection 
in Swaziland in comparison to measures that other jurisdictions have in place for the 
protection of minority shareholder rights. The second part looks at what the ideal 
shareholder appraisal rights law in Swaziland should contain in light of the current 
legislation as a means to make it more easily accessible to minority shareholders. 
The purpose of the dissertation is not to recommend a wholesome transplant of 
shareholder appraisal rights of either one of the jurisdictions under discussion, but to 
highlight the best practices of the jurisdictions and suggest a shareholder appraisal 
rights law that best suits the Swaziland business and economic environment. 
The dissertation is divided into eight Chapters. Chapter one is the introduction. 
Chapter two will discuss the history of the appraisal remedy and the underlying 
philosophy behind the remedy. Chapter three will discuss the underlying rationale for 
the introduction of the appraisal remedy into South African company law. Chapter 
four will discuss the appraisal procedure contained in section 164 of the South 
African Companies Act 71 of 2008 as well as the requirements that minority 
shareholders have to comply with before invoking the appraisal remedy. Chapter five 
4 
discusses the effectiveness of the appraisal remedy as a form of minority 
shareholder protection. Chapter six will discuss minority shareholder protection in the 
United Kingdom including current legislative procedures in place. Chapter seven will 
examine minority shareholder protection in Swaziland including discussing the 
current legislative procedures in place. The discussion on minority shareholder 
protection in light of these seven chapters will be concluded in Chapter eight and 
recommendations on better minority shareholder protection in Swaziland will be 
made. 
As a means to facilitating the creation of business combinations, promoting flexibility 
and enhancing efficiency in the South African economy and reducing the 
opportunities for regulatory arbitrage, the legislature liberalised the fundamental 
transactions policy under the Companies Act 71 of 2008 ('the Act'). Although the Act 
does not define the phrase 'fundamental transactions', these are transactions that 
alter a company and comprise of: a disposal of all or the greater part of the assets or 
the undertaking of a company; 1 an amalgamation or merger;2 and a scheme of 
arrangement. 3 
The revision of the Act has introduced two major reforms firstly; the innovative 
American concept of amalgamations and mergers (M & A} which is also referred to 
as the 'statutory merger'. The statutory merger is in essence a simple, 
uncomplicated and effective procedure whereby the assets, liabilities and sometimes 
shareholders of two or more companies ('merging companies') are combined 
together; resulting in one or more of the combining companies ('the surviving 
company') or newly formed company ('the new company'). It should be noted that 
For the merger/ amalgamation to be authorised, it has to be approved by a special 
resolution of the company's stakeholders. 
Secondly, the Act introduced the remedy of appraisal rights for dissenting 
shareholders which is a remedy that gives dissenting shareholders the right to 'opt 
out' of the company by being paid the fair value for their shares in cash. The court's 
1 Section 112. 
2 Section 113. 
3 Section 114. 
involvement in this instance is restricted to certain specified circumstances.4 The 
liberalised nature of the fundamental transactions policy makes minority 
shareholders vulnerable to abuse and domination by majority shareholders because 
it negates the shareholders vested right/ shareholding right.5 Further, it adopts an 
approach that holds the interests of the shareholders subject to the judgement and 
decisions of the collective majority. 6 
5 
As an offset to the effect that the liberalisation of the policy might have on minority 
shareholders who disapprove of a fundamental transaction, the South African 
legislature introduced an appraisal remedy which is a non-fault remedy that gives the 
dissenting shareholders the right to 'opt out' of the company by receiving an amount 
of money in cash for the fair value of their shares, by invoking the appraisal remedy. 
Many scholars have acknowledged the appraisal remedy as the primary protective 
remedy for minority shareholders in fundamental transactions. However, the 
appraisal remedy is viewed by dissidents as being ineffective in its current form due 
to its complicated procedures, technicalities and procedurally rigid procedures. The 
complexities of the appraisal remedy are time consuming and are costly to the 
dissenting shareholder, which in turn limits the efficiency of the appraisal remedy and 
the appraisal remedy becomes less appealing to the minority shareholder as 
recourse? 
In my view, although certain provisions of the appraisal remedy are too limiting and 
thus ineffective in its current form, through simplification of its procedures, the 
appraisal remedy has the potential of becoming 'the primary protective remedy of 
minority shareholders' and only then will this remedy be more accessible to minority 
shareholders who seek to use it; as the excessive costs and time consuming 
implications would/ could be greatly reduced.8 This in effect would allow the remedy 
4 
Where the company has failed to make an offer at all to the minority shareholder for the acquisition of his 
shares or if the company has made an offer that is considered by the minority shareholder to be inadequate. 
5 
M F Cassim 'The Introduction of the Statutory Merger in South African Corporate Law: Majority Rule Offset 
by the Appraisal Right (Part 1)' (2008) 20 SA MereU 1 at 21-2. 
6 1bid. 
7 
F H I Cassim, M F Cassim, R Cassim, R Jooste, J Shev & J Yeates Contemporary Company Law 2 ed (2012) 798. 
8 
B l Nicol The Effectiveness of the Appraisal Right as a Form of Shareholder Protection (Unpublished LLM 
thesis, University of Cape Town, 2014) 2. 
to counter the liberalisation of fundamental transactions policy thus strike a fairer 
balance between the interest of minority and majority shareholders.9 
In Swaziland, on the other hand, the legislature is lagging behind regarding 
legislating for the protection of minority rights; minority shareholder protection exists 
however a comprehensive appraisal law does not exist and dissenting shareholders 
find themselves being bound by the decisions of the majority with no option to 'opt 




II THE ORIGINS OF THE APPRAISAL RIGHT AND ITS PURPOSE 
The appraisal remedy is an American innovation and has been in existence for over 
a century although, no consensus has been reached with regards to its primary 
purpose and role in modern corporate law.10 It is worth noting that currently, all fifty 
states in the United States provide for an appraisal remedy in one form or another 
and despite the differing legislation amongst states, shareholders are afforded the 
right to be paid out in cash the fair-value of their shares, on the occurrence of certain 
triggering actions for a price equal to the value of the shares.11 
Historically, mergers and other fundamental transactions in the United States of 
America required the unanimous approval of all the shareholders of a company for 
the fundamental transaction to commence. In order to promote commerce and trade, 
corporate statutes were amended to adapt to the ever-changing corporate regime 
and to allow companies to engage in fundamental transactions without the need for a 
unanimous shareholder approval; rather the majority of shareholders sufficed. 
Consequently, individual and minority shareholders were not able to veto 
fundamental company transactions thus the appraisal remedy was granted to 
shareholders to compensate for the loss of that veto power.12 Generally, it has been 
agreed that the appraisal remedy served as a quid pro quo for the loss of 
shareholders right to veto fundamental company transactions. Further, the appraisal 
remedy became a liquidity rationale because it provided dissenting shareholders a 
mechanism to exit the company. 13 
Originally, the consideration in mergers was limited to securities and not extended to 
a cash consideration, thus the appraisal remedy was justified as an exit mechanism 
10 B M Wertheimer 'The Purpose of the Shareholders' Appraisal Remedy' (1997-1998) 65 Tennessee Law 
Review 661 at 661-62. 
11 Under the Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA or Model Act), the following events trigger the availability 
of the appraisal remedy: 1) consummation of a plan of merger; 2) consummation of a plan of share exchange; 
3) consummation of a sale or exchange of all, or substantially all, of the property of the corporation outside of 
the usual and regular course of business; and 4) certain amendments to the corporation's articles of 
incorporation. B M Wertheimer 'The Shareholder's Appraisal Remedy and How Courts Determine Fair value' 
(1998) 4 Duke Law Journa/613 at 616. 
12 
Wertheimer op cit note 10 at 662. 
13
M F Cassim 'The Introduction ofthe Statutory Merger in South African Corporate Law: Majority 
Rule Offset by the Appraisal Right (Part 2)' (2008) SA Mereu 20 at 158. 
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and dissenting minority shareholders who objected to a merger were entitled to 
receive the fair value of their shares in cash and relinquish their positions in the 
respective company. 14 Without this remedy, dissidents would have been forced to be 
party to investments they did not want to be a part of; with a risk profile they would 
not have accepted.15 This is known as the 'defeated expectations' view, which 
entitles shareholders the liberty to own shares in companies that they desire and not 
to be bound as a result of a merger, to hold shares in investment(s) different from 
what they had initially sought to invest in.16 
Subsequently, the regulation of corporate transactions was relaxed and cash was 
permitted as consideration in mergers. The modern justification for the appraisal 
remedy is the protect minority shareholders from being inadequately priced and to 
ensure that they receive a fair value for their shares in a company. 17 This 
phenomenon is known as the 'remedy-for-unfairness' justification and it is premised 
upon the fact that directors negotiate the business terms of the merger; and can 
easily neglect their duty to secure the highest price, to the detriment of the 
shareholders. Thus, the appraisal remedy also functions as a deterrent to directors 
from making bad business decisions that would affect the dissenting shareholders' 
interests in the business, adversely in that the greater the number of dissenting 
shareholders the higher the possibility of the board reconsidering the transaction. 18 
The three main objectives of the appraisal remedy are that it provides a conducive 
market for mergers; provides liquidity to dissenting shareholders; and serves as a 
deterrent from opportunism by the directors and the majority shareholders of the 
company. 19 The appraisal remedy therefore strikes a balance between the need for 
companies to be managed based on the majority vote with the need to protect the 
minority against being involuntarily dragged along into a drastically restructured 
enterprise in which it has no confidence'. 20 
However, if the proposed fundamental transaction i.e. a merger does not result in a 






19 Ibid at 159. 
20 Ibid. 
the dissident shareholders; the majority shareholders may still effect almost any 
transaction with impunity.21 Thus the appraisal remedy is recourse that is at the 
disposal of the minority shareholders, to protect them from discrimination while 
preserving the flexibility that is required for changing business conditions.22 
9 
The appraisal remedy is contentious and has generated much controversy in relation 
to the fundamental changes it introduced. For instance Manning discusses how the 
appraisal remedy ought to apply and he questions the arbitrary selection of certain 
transactions, which state legislatures in the United States have selected for special 
treatment.23 He argues in his survey of state appraisal statutes by transactions that 
statutes of North Carolina and Louisiana24 are comparable, as states that provide for 
the appraisal remedy in circumstances similar to the Companies Act.25 
It is important to note that the appraisal remedy has evolved from being a remedy 
available to protect the interests of dissident shareholders when they exit a company 
to giving 'greater mobility of action to the majority'.26 As pointed out by Manning, 'the 
appraisal statutes may be viewed either as a bulwark for the rights of the minority, or 
as a lubricant to speed the spread of majoritarianism. Of course the statutes might 
do both, depending upon their administration and their application'.27 
These observations seem to have been correct because in 1994, the American Law 
Institute's corporate governance project summarised US corporate law as a 'largely 
unqualified system of majoritarian control. '28 
21 A Pike A Textual Analysis of Section 164 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (Unpublished LLM thesis, University 
of Cape Town, 2013) 7. 
22 1bid. 
23 B Manning 'The Shareholder's Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker' (1962) 72 Yale Law Journal 223 
at 226- 227. 
24 Ibid at 264. 
25 No 71 of 2008. 
26 Manning op cit note 24 at 227. 
27 
Manning op cit note 24 at 230. 
28 American Law Institute Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations 
(1994) 291. 
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Ill THE APPRAISAL RIGHT IN SOUTH AFRICA AND ITS PURPOSE 
As stated earlier, the appraisal remedy is a new phenomenon in South African law 
that has been adopted from the United States of America's corporate law and may 
best be described as a right of dissenting shareholders who do not approve of any 
triggering events to have their shares bought out by the company in cash, at a price 
reflecting the fair value of the shares; value, which may in certain cases be 
determined judicially.29 
Fundamental company transactions have a major impact on society: they play an 
integral role in the efficient distribution of a society's resources and it involves 
matters of public interest and policy.3° Companies established under modern 
company legislation are considered democratic organisations but are subject to 
majority rule. As a result, minority shareholders are vulnerable to manipulation and 
exploitation by the majority. For example, majority shareholders may take decisions 
that have the short-term effect of decreasing the price of a company's shares in 
order to acquire the minority's interest in the company at low price.31 The appraisal 
remedy therefore purports to strike a balance between encouraging economic 
activity and protecting the interests of the company's shareholders. 32 
Section 16433 governs the appraisal remedy under the South African corporate law 
and a large part of it is derived from the equivalent provision in the Canadian Act. 34 
This section was introduced to Strike a balance between a) the newly adopted newly 
adopted fundamental transaction and b) enhance efficiency in the economy.35 
The appraisal remedy is not a general right and it can be invoked under two 
circumstances namely, where the company gives notice to its shareholders that it 
proposes to pass a special resolution to: (a) amend its Memorandum of 
29 
Cassim op cit note51 at 21-22. 
30 
E Davids, T Norwitz & D Yuiii'A microscopic analysis of the new merger and amalgamation provision in the 
Companies Act 71 of 2008' in T H Mongalo (ed) Acta Juridica: Modern Company Law for a Competitive South 
African Economy (2010) 337. 
31 
Wertheimer op cit note 10 at 661-662. 
32 Davids op cit note 30 at 338. 
33 
The Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
34 
Canada Business Corporations Act RSC 1985, c. C-44 s190. 
35 
Notice of intention to introduce a Bill into Parliament: Explanatory summary of Bill General Notice 166 of 
2007 at 13. 
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Incorporation by altering the preferences, rights, limitations or other terms of any 
class of its shares, in any manner materially adverse to the rights or interests of 
holders of that class of shares, as contemplated in section 37 (8) 36 ; (b) enter into a 
transaction contemplated in sections 112, 113 or 114.37 
The transactions contemplated in sections 112, 113 and 114 are transactions that 
involve the disposal of all or the greater part of the assets or the undertaking of a 
company. Further, the transactions that are entered into by a company under the 
transaction of amalgamation or merger or a scheme of arrangement are commonly 
known as fundamental transactions. In cases where the transaction is not part of a 
business rescue plan, the company must first give notice to the shareholders of a 
meeting whereby a resolution, pursuant to a fundamental transaction will be 
considered for adoption. 
The appraisal remedy is a no-fault remedy and when it is granted, it is acknowledged 
that the fundamental transactions may have significant and far-reaching 
consequences for shareholders.38 When the appraisal remedy is granted, it is 
indicative that the nature of the company and the rights of the shareholders could be 
drastically altered.39 In the absence of general court involvement, the remedy has 
become the primary protective remedy for minority shareholders of companies that 
are involved in fundamental transactions. The remedy gives the minority shareholder 
a right to 'opt out' of the company by receiving a fair value of their shares in cash. 
In order to strike a balance between providing flexibility for the majority shareholders, 
to enable them to modify the company and alter investor's rights as a means to 
adapt to the ever changing business environment, and the need to protect minority 
shareholders' rights; fundamental transactions operate in the interests of flexibility 
subject to majority rule.40 As a quid pro quo, the dissenting minority shareholders are 
granted the appraisal remedy as an exit strategy, thus the remedy is one that 
36 Section 164 (2) (a) of Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
37 
Section 164 (2) (b) of Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
38 
Cassim et al op cit note 7 at 796. 
39 1bid. 
40 Cassim et al op cit note 7 at 796-797. 
balances the rights of the majority shareholders with those of the minority 
shareholders.41 
12 
The appraisal remedy has three main objects: firstly, it is traditionally justified as an 
exit strategy for dissenters, it gives them the right to 'opt out' of the company by 
receiving an amount in cash for the fair value of their shares through the exercise of 
their appraisal remedy.42 Without the appraisal remedy, dissenting shareholders 
would otherwise be forced to be shareholders in a company they did not want to 
invest in, with a risk profile they had not accepted. 
The second object of the remedy is that it is perceived as a vital remedy for 
unfairness and gives the dissenter the right to approach the court to challenge the 
value in cash that is offered for the shares.43 The third object is that the appraisal 
remedy serves as a deterrent to directors, from making bad business judgments and 
the greater the number of dissenting shareholders invoking the appraisal remedy, 
the greater the likelihood the board of directors might reconsider the implementation 
of that transaction.44 
It must be stated that from the perspective of the company, the obligation to 
purchase the appraised shares may drain the company's liquidity which may result in 
the abandonment of the proposed fundamental transaction which could have been 
favourable for the company.45 In addition, shares that have been surrendered to the 
company in the exercise of the appraisal remedy become shares that are authorised 
but not issued46, and they become cancelled, as the company is barred from holding 
them as treasury shares. 
Before invoking the appraisal remedy, the dissenting shareholders must perfect the 
appraisal remedy by complying with a complex appraisal procedure, as set out in 
Section 164 of the Companies Act (South Africa). 
First, the shareholder must send a written notice to the company objecting to the 
resolution when that shareholder is made aware of the resolution that is being 
41 
Ibid at 797. 
42 




45 Manning op cit note 24 at 241. 
40 Section 35 (5) of Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
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considered for adoption.47 Secondly, once the proposed resolution has been 
adopted, the dissenting shareholders must submit a written demand to the company 
for the fair value of their shares. Thirdly, the resolution that has been adopted must 
have been supported by at least seventy-five percent of the shareholders entitled to 
vote at a meeting specifically called for that purpose.48 Fourthly, the shareholder 
must have voted against the resolution when it was considered for adoption.49 Lastly, 
the shareholder must have complied with all the procedural requirements as stated 
in section 164 of the Companies Act. 
After the perfection of the appraisal remedy requirements by the dissenter, the 
company must make an offer to pay the dissenter an amount in cash that is 
considered by the directors to be fair value of the shares. The value of the shares 
should be determined immediately before the company adopts the resolution.50 
Should the dissenter deem that the company's offer for the shares is not adequate or 
the company did not make an offer at all, the dissenter is entitled to apply to court for 
the fair determination of the value of the shares. 
The appraisal remedy can also be invoked by shareholders of listed companies 
despite the fact that those dissenters can sell their shares on the open market and 
this is permitted because financial markets are said to be notoriously imperfect. In 
contrast, some states in the USA provide for a market exception which excludes the 
availability of the appraisal remedy in respect of shares that have a reliable value 
and are traded in a liquid market. 51 
One of the major advantages of the appraisal remedy is that it is not court driven and 
the court only intervenes at the very end of the appraisal procedure, when there are 
some disagreements. 52The mandatory steps to perfect the appraisal right are 
considered below. 
47 
Section 164 (3) of Companies Act 71 of 2008: at any time before the resolution referred is to be voted on. 
48 Section 115 (1) read with section 115 (2)(a) of Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
49 Section 164 (5) (c) (i) of Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
5° Cassim et al op cit note 7 at 797. 
51 
Cassim op cit note 13 at 162. 
52 Cassim et al op cit note 7 at 798. 
IV THE APPRAISAL PROCEDURE 
Before the appraisal remedy can be invoked, the dissenting shareholders must 
satisfy the appraisal remedy requirements by complying with a complex appraisal 
procedure as set out in section 164.53The appraisal procedure will be discussed in 
greater detail below. 
(a) Statement of appraisal rights 
Section 164 of the Act does not create an obligation on the company to give the 
meeting notice where the proposed resolution to adopt the transaction will be taken 
however, section 164 (2) does compel the company to include in the notice for the 
meeting, a statement informing shareholders of the appraisal remedy. The aim is to 
ensure that dissidents are aware of their right to invoke the appraisal remedy and 
seek relief that is available in relation to triggering events. 
14 
The notice requirements are provided for under these sections: s112(3) requires 'a 
written summary of the provisions of section 164'. Section 113(5) requires 'a copy or 
summary of section 164, in a manner that satisfies prescribed standards'. Section 
114 requires 'a copy of section 164 to be included in the report and since there is no 
prescribed standard, the copy or summary must be in plain language. 54 Due to the 
inconsistencies in terminology in the above mentioned sections regarding what 
constitutes a statement informing shareholders of the appraisal remedy, it is 
recommended that a meeting notice should include a copy and a summary of s164 
to avoid constituting a material defect as contemplated in ss 62(4) and 62(5). 
In relation to the requirement to include the appraisal remedy statement in the 
meeting notice, a Canadian court in the case of Fitch v Churchill Corp55 held that a 
notice which simply state that 'the Act provides that a shareholder has a right to 
dissent if the corporation resolves to amend its articles' will not suffice. The 
Canadian Act refers to a notice that includes at least an explanation of all the rights 
53 
Companies Act No 71, 2008. 
54 
Section 6 (5). 
55 
[1990] 4 WWR 256, citing the Business Corporations Act SA 1981 c B-15. 
afforded to dissidents, including the right to be paid for the shares in the event of a 
structural change to the constitutional documents of the company being the most 
critical. 56 
(b) Notice of objection by dissenting shareholder 
15 
Section 164 (3) provides that a dissenting shareholder may notify the company 
through written notice that he objects to the proposed resolution. The written notice 
must however be given at any time prior to that resolution being voted on. Although 
this section states that a notice of objection 'may' be given, giving notice is one of the 
essential prerequisites for the exercise of an appraisal remedy as stated in sections 
164 (5), 37 (8) and 115 (8); and failure to submit written notice my result in the 
dissenter losing the right to invoke and use the appraisal remedy, as one 
requirement would be lacking. 57 As soon as dissenting shareholders are made aware 
of a triggering event being proposed for adoption, they are advised to immediately 
submit a written notice objecting to its adoption before the resolution is passed. 
The written notice requirement may be excused only under the following two 
instances: firstly where the company failed to include a statement of the 
shareholders appraisal rights in the notice of the meeting; secondly, where the 
company failed to give notice of the meeting.58 If the statement of the appraisal 
remedy is made but does not satisfy the definition of 'plain language' as provided for 
in section 6(5), the statement will be defective. This will consequently, constitute a 
failure to include a statement of the s164 rights; thus giving rise to a valid exception 
in terms of section 164(6).59 
The rationale behind the dissenting shareholders providing the company with written 
notice of their objection, prior to the meeting, is to make the company aware of the 
number of dissenters, giving the company an opportunity to estimate the amount of 
cash payment that it could be required to pay when the appraisal remedy is invoked. 
Appraisal demands have the potential of impacting negatively on the monetary 
56 
Section 190 (5) Canadian Business Corporations Act, 1985. 
57 Cassim et al op cit note 7 at 800. 
58 
Section 164 (6) of Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
59 Nicol op cit note 8 at 21. 
resources of a company that would be obliged to purchase the appraised shares 
thus it assists the company to be pre-emptive in this regard.60 
16 
If a large number of shareholders intend dissenting, the board may reconsider its 
decision to proceed with the fundamental transaction before it is voted on by the 
shareholders in the meeting. A resolution may subsequently be revoked even after it 
has been adopted.61 It must be stated that where the company revokes the 
resolution, the dissidents' right to an appraisal falls away as there is no longer a 
transaction on which to dissent. 
Further, the appraisal remedy is only available to shareholders who are entitled to 
vote on the relevant resolution and does not extend to shareholders who are 
debarred from voting on resolutions in terms of s115(4), nor to shareholders who do 
not hold any voting rights. 
(c) Notice of adoption of the resolution 
The company must, within ten business days after adopting a fundamental 
transaction resolution, send notice of the adoption to each shareholder who gave the 
company written notice of objection and who has not withdrawn that notice nor voted 
in support of the resolution.62 Failure by the company to provide such notice, within 
the ten business days, does not result in adverse legal consequences against it but it 
may have practical consequences for example, delays in the delivery of demands by 
dissenting shareholders to the company.63 
(d) Demand by dissenting shareholder 
Before a dissenting shareholder may be entitled to demand that the company pay 
the fair value for all the shares of the company held by him/her, the shareholder must 
'perfect' the appraisal right by satisfying the following procedural requirements:64 (a) 
the shareholder must have sent the company a notice of objection, subject to the 
60 Ibid. 
61 
Section 164 (9) (c) of Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
62 
Section 164 (4) of Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
63 
Cassim et al op cit note 7 at 801. 
64 Section 164 (5) of Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
exceptions listed in section 164 (6); (b) The company must have adopted the 
contemplated resolution; and (c) The shareholder must have voted against that 
resolution in the meeting and complied with all of the procedural requirements of 
section 164. 
17 
The demand should be made by delivering a written notice to the company within 20 
business days after receipt of a notice of adoption of the resolution65, or within 20 
business days after learning that the resolution has been adopted.66 The demand 
must also be delivered to the Takeover Regulation Panel67 and should contain the 
details set out in Section 164 (8).68 
Canada uses a similar procedure whereby it is only after the resolution is passed 
that the dissident must provide the number and class of shares in respect of which 
he dissents by way of demand. However, section 190 (7) of the Canadian Act does 
not set a fixed deadline upon which the letter of demand ought to be submitted to the 
company.69 In the case of South Africa, this requirement is problematic. 
A dissenting shareholder who has satisfied the procedural requirements provided for 
in sections 164(5) to (8) and sent a demand to the company has no further rights in 
respect of those shares other than to be paid their fair value.70 This is based on the 
premise that the dissident has voluntarily elected to 'opt out' of the company and all 
that remains is for the dissident to be paid the fair value of those shares. 71 
The dissidents also lose their rights to future distributions and to vote with effect from 
that point on however, the ambit of the relinquished rights is not clear for example it 
is left open whether the dissidents would have the right to bring an oppression 
application which is a remedy to a shareholder or director of a company for the 
65 
If the shareholder has failed to receive notice of the resolution. 
66 
Section 164 (7) of Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
67 
Section 164(8) of the Companies Act, although the twenty business days requirement in s 165 {7) of the Act, 
it clearly does not apply to delivery of the demand to the Panel. It is not clear why the requirement to deliver 
the demand to the Panel applies in respect of all companies, including companies that are not 'regulated 
companies'. 
68 
The demand must state the shareholder's name and address, the number and class of shares in respect of 
which he seeks payment, and a demand for the payment of the fair value of those shares. 
69 
Pike op cit note 22 at 27. 
70 
Section 164 (9) of Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
71 
Cassim et al op cit note 7 at 802. 
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abuse of the separate juristic personality of the company as contemplated in section 
163. 
Section 184 (11) of the Canada Business Corporations Acf2 was similarly worded to 
Section 164 (9) of the South African Companies Act and thus may be helpful in the 
resolution of the ambit of the rights lost by the dissenting shareholder.73 
A Canadian court in the case of Brant Investments Ltd v Keeprite lnc74 held that on 
submission of a demand, a dissident did not lose the right to challenge oppressive 
action but only lost the rights to dividends of the company and to vote because the 
appraisal remedy was a contingent remedy which entitled the dissident to withdraw 
his demand; and retain his full rights as a shareholder. Under South African 
legislation, a similar approach is adopted.75 
Although a shareholder relinquished all their rights in respect of his/her shares, the 
shareholders rights are reinstated without interruption in three circumstances: first, in 
the event that the dissenter withdraws the demand before the company makes an 
offer, or allows the offer made by the company to lapse; secondly, where the 
company fails to make an offer and the shareholder withdraws the demand; thirdly, 
where the company revokes the adopted resolution by way of special resolution 
regarding the fundamental transaction in question, that gave rise to the shareholder's 
appraisal right. 76 
Section 164 does not explicitly disallow partial dissent however, section 164(5) 
provides that a dissenting shareholder may demand the fair value for 'all of the 
shares of the company held by that person'; this suggests that partial dissent by the 
shareholder is not permissible and implies that a dissenting shareholder must 
demand that the company purchase all of his shares regardless of their class thus 
preventing shareholders from hedging their bets. 78 
72 S.C. 1974-75-76, c. 33. 
73 74 
Provides that 'After sending a notice ... a dissenting shareholder ceases to have any rights as a shareholder 
except the right to be paid the fair value of his shares as determined under this section, unless the dissenting. 
shareholder withdraws his notice before the corporation makes an offer ... in which case his rights as a 
shareholder are reinstated.' 
74 {1983) 44 OR {2d) 661 (Ont HC) at 664. 
75 Section 164(9)(o) to (c) and s 164(10). 
76 Section 164 (9) and (10). 
78 Cassim et al op cit note 7 at 803. 
Section 164(5)(a)(ii) provides that for a dissenting shareholder to exercise the 
appraisal remedy, where there has been an amendment to the company's 
memorandum of incorporation, the dissenter must hold 'shares of a class that are 
materially adversely affected by the amendment'. 
The wording of Section 164 (5) is ambiguous because the two operative phrases, 
namely 'all of the shares' and 'shares of a class' are seemingly at odds with each 
other and it appears that if an amendment affects only a particular class of shares, 
the dissident may only exercise the appraisal remedy in relation to all the shares 
held by it. 79 
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Relinquishing all the shares held by a dissident would be unjust and prejudicial; this 
is not what the legislature intended ; whereas from a company's perspective, 
proposing bona fide amendments to the Memorandum of Incorporation that affect 
one class of shares could be a way to prevent opportunistic dissidents from 
liquidating their capital; thus affecting the liquidity of the company. A narrow 
interpretation of section 164(5) would result in an unfairness and prejudice to the 
dissident thus it is submitted that the dissidents demand must only relate to shares 
that fall within the affected class. 80 It is also submitted that the reading of s 164 (8) 
(b)81 implies that the legislature intended to permit partial dissent. 
Section 190 (1) of the Canadian Act82 allows for partial dissent because it states that 
a holder of shares, of any class, of a company may dissent if the company resolves 
to pass a resolution undertaking the following: amend its articles to add, change or 
remove any provisions restricting or constraining the issue and transfer ownership of 
shares of that class. Section 190(3) entitles a shareholder who dissents to be paid by 
the company the fair value of the shares in respect of which the shareholder 
dissents. This further implies that under the Canadian law, partial dissent is 
permitted. Section 190 (4) qualifies the right to partial dissent by stating that a 
dissenting shareholder may only claim in respect of all the shares of a class, held on 
behalf of any one beneficial owner and registered in the name of the dissenting 
shareholder. It must be stated that the Canadian position is that a dissenting 
79 
Pike op cit note 22 at 27. 
80 
Cassim et al op cit note 7 at 803. 
81 
The demand must state the number and class of shares in respect of which the shareholder seeks payment 
82 
Canada Business Corporations Act, 1985. 
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shareholder may dissent in relation to one class of shares, even if it holds shares in 
more than one class, provided that it dissents in relation to all the shares in that 
class, held by it. 83 
(e) Offer by the company 
Once the company has received a written demand from dissenting shareholders to 
be paid the fair value of their shares, the company must, within five business days, 
after the later of:84 (a) on which the action approved by the resolution is effective; (b) 
the last day of receipt of demands in terms of subsection (7) (a) or; (c) or the day the 
company received a demand as contemplated in subsection (7) (b) if applicable, 
send to each shareholder who has sent such a demand a written offer to pay an 
amount considered by the company's directors to be the fair value of the relevant 
shares; accompanied by a statement showing how the value was determined. 
The fair value must be determined as at the date on which, and at the time 
immediately before, the company adopted the resolution that gave rise to the 
shareholders appraisal rights. 85 Every offer made by the company to the dissenting 
shareholders, in respect of shares of the same class or series, must be on the same 
terms. In addition, the offer lapses if it has not been accepted within thirty business 
days after it was made.86 
The Companies Act does not specify how the fair value of the shares is to be arrived 
at but it must be noted that fair value does not necessarily mean market value, as in 
most cases the market value is usually not the true value of a company.87 It is 
submitted that South African courts can seek guidance from and emulate the long-
standing judicial experience of the Delaware courts which have for some time 
undertaken court valuations and developed its jurisprudence in this regard.88 
Section 164, does not impose a penalty in circumstances where a company fails to 
make an offer at all but a dissident shareholder may have to resort to invoking 
83 Pike op cit note 22 at 21-22. 
84 Section 164 (11) (a), (b) and (c). 
85 Section 164 (16). 
86 Section 164 (12) (a) and (b). 
87
Cassim et al op cit note 7 at 809. 
88 1bid. 
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Section 218 (2).89 This provision is important for two reasons; (a) it gives any person 
locus standi whether or not they have shareholder rights; and it imposes strict 
liability.90 
(f) Shareholder's acceptance of the offer 
A dissenting shareholder who has made a written demand to the company to be paid 
the fair value of the shares has an option whether to accept or reject the offer made 
by the company for the shares, within thirty business days after which the offer was 
made otherwise the offer lapses.91 If the offer lapses, all the shareholders rights in 
respect of those shares, are reinstated without interruption.92 
If a dissenting shareholder accepts the offer, the dissident must tender the share 
certificates to the company or its transfer agent and in the case of uncertified shares, 
the dissident must take the steps required by Section 53 to direct the transfer of the 
shares to the company or its transfer agent.93. 
Once the company has received notice of acceptance of the offer made to the 
dissenting shareholder and the dissenter has surrendered the share certificates or 
directed the transfer of the uncertified shares to the company, the company must 
within ten business days, pay that dissenter the agreed amount.94 If however, the 
company has reasonable grounds to believe that in settling the agreed upon amount 
for the shares to the dissenter, the company will be unable to pay its debts, the 
company may apply to a court for an order varying its obligations.95 
The question that arises is whether the company either pays a dissenting 
shareholder the agreed amount, or applies to the court for an order varying its 
obligations? The dissenting shareholder also has a right to apply to court to 
determine the fair value of the shares, where the company has made an offer which 
89 Any person who contravenes any provision of this Act is liable to any other person for any loss or damage 
suffered by that person as a result of that contravention. 
90 
Section 218(2) does not provide for a fault standard. 
91 Section 164 (12) (b). 
92 Section 164(9) and (10). 
93 By a dissident sending an instruction to transfer which is properly authenticated and effecting transfer in 
accordance with the rules of a central securities depository through the debiting of the dissidents account in 
the uncertified securities register and crediting the company's account in the uncertified securities register. 
94 Section 164 (13) (b). 
95 Section 164 (17) (a). 
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the shareholder considers to be inadequate or if no order was made at all.96 
However, section 164 does not make provision for a dissenting shareholder to apply 
to court if the company simply fails to pay the agreed amount. 
It is submitted that where a company fails to pay, the dissenter will have to prove that 
there existed a valid contract between the dissenter and the company that the 
company made an offer and the dissenter accepted the offer by tendering his shares 
for the agreed amount, which renders the shareholder a creditor of the company.97 
The dissident may also rely on section 218(2)98to find the company liable for the loss 
or damages the dissenter has suffered. 
(g) Application to court to determine fair value 
In the event that the company neither makes an offer at all or makes an offer that is 
considered by the dissident to be inadequate, after the dissident has submitted a 
written demand, the dissident may apply to a court for judicial appraisal to determine 
the 'fair value' of the shares, together with an order requiring the company to pay the 
dissident the fair value as determined by the court; provided the offer has not lapsed 
(if it has not been accepted within 30 business days).99 
When the appraisal right is invoked, the involvement of the court is not inevitable or 
automatic but only occurs at the final stages of the appraisal procedure, if and when 
necessary.100 Minimal court involvement is one of the most appealing features of the 
appraisal right and a means to promote settlement, thus before the court gets 
involved in the determination of the fair value of the shares, the dissenters have a 
right to accept the offer made by the company in respect of the fair value of the 
shares.101 This, however, may also be susceptible to abuse by shareholders. 102 
96 HGJ Beukes 'An Introduction to the Appraisal Remedy in the Companies Act 2008: Standing and 
the Appraisal Procedure' (2010) 22 SA MereU 176 at 190. 
97 Jbid. 
98 Which makes any person who contravenes this section liable to any other person for any loss or damage 
suffered by that person as a result ofthat contravention. 
99 
Section 164(14). 
100 Cassim et al op cit note 7 at 805. 
101 Section 164(15)(a). 
102 Cassim et al op cit note 7 at 806. 
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On an application to the court for judicial appraisal of the shares, all dissenting 
shareholders who have not accepted an offer from the company as at the date of the 
application, must be joined as parties and are bound by the decision of the court. 103 
It must be noted that the fair value as determined by the court, will not apply to 
dissenting shareholders who had initially accepted the offer made by the company of 
the fair value of the shares.104 The company must notify each affected dissenting 
shareholder of the date, place and consequences of the application and of their right 
to participate in the court proceedings. 105 Furthermore, the court may determine 
whether any other person is a dissenting shareholder who should be joined as a 
party.1os 
The Act107 is not clear as to who falls into the category of being an affected 
dissenting shareholder but a deduction could be made that, it is any dissenting 
shareholders who has not accepted the offer made by the company as at the date of 
the application. 108 Section 190(19)(a) of The Canadian Act109 on the other hand, is 
clearly defines, who would be considered an affected dissenting shareholder by 
stating that: dissidents who are party to the application are 'all dissidents', whose 
shares have not been purchased by the company. 
The court must determine the 'fair value', in respect of the shares of all the 
dissenting shareholders, as at the date on which, and time immediately before, the 
company adopted the resolution that gave rise to the shareholder's appraisal 
rights. 110 The Act is silent on the meaning of 'fair value' and does not provide a 
method of valuation. 111 The court is however, given the discretion to appoint one or 
more appraisers to assist it in determining the fair value.112 It must be noted that in 
most cases the 'fair value' is not necessarily equivalent to the market value alone 
103 
Section 164 (15)(a). 
104 
Cassim et al op cit note 7 at 805. 
105 
Section 164 (15) (b). 
106 Section 164 (15) (c) (i). 
107 
Companies Act 71, 2008. 
108 Section 164(15)(a). 
109 
Canadian Business Corporations Act, 1985. 
110 
Section 164(15)(c)(ii); s 164(16). 
111 




and may not be a true reflection of the worth of the company; for instances in cases 
where the shares are undervalued or there is no market for the shares.113 
Even though the fair price of shares has been considered in the context of the 
oppression remedy under section 252114 and the mandatory acquisition of shares of 
minorities115, the scenarios in which these provisions apply, are totally different in 
that they do not involve a willing buyer and seller transaction, unlike with the 
appraisal remedy.116 
This problem is further compounded by the fact that South African courts do not 
appear to have accessed the well-developed international jurisprudence relating to 
the valuation of shareholding. The case of Hickman v Oban Infrastructure (Pty) 
Limited117 presented an opportunity for the courts to determine critically and 
consolidate the definition and interpretation of the valuation of shares but this 
opportunity was, unfortunately, missed.118 
The Act does not specifying the method for evaluation of the fair value, which 
creates confusion and uncertainty because it does not stipulate a standard method 
on how to determine the fair value; especially because the fair value is not 
necessarily equivalent to market value. In many instances market value is not a true 
reflection of the worth of the company or the fair value of its shares; for instance 
where the shares are undervalued on the market or in a depressed market or where 
there is no market for the shares.119 
Foreign jurisdictions, in particular the US state of Delaware, have developed a sound 
valuation methodology over a period of 150 years. Taking into account the 
113 
Cassim et al op cit note 7 at 809. 
114 The Companies Act, 1973. 
115 Section 440k of the Companies Act, 1973. 
116 Cassim et al op cit note 7 at 809. 
117 (unreported case no. 2008/18332, judgement delivered on March 3 2010). 
118 The brief facts of the case were that the applicant was excluded from the management of the company due 
to a deterioration in the relationship between the applicant and another shareholder who had considerable 
influence over the other shareholders. As a minority shareholder, the applicant sought either to have his 
shares bought in terms of the broad remedies that a court could grant under s252(3) of the old Companies Act 
(81 of 1973) or, in the alternative, to have the company wound-up in terms of s344(h) of that Act on the 
grounds of loss of confidence in the management of the company and his exclusion from the company's 
subsidiary. The court found in favour of the applicant and ordered that the applicant's shares must be 
purchased at a fair market value, but it failed to stipulate how the fair market value was to be determined. It 
merely ordered that a valuer be appointed to determine the 'fair market value' of the shares and that the 
valuer's finding would be binding on the parties. 
119 Cassim op cit note 13 at 167-171. 
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developments in foreign jurisdictions, it is suggested that the legislature should 
consider amending or extending the current Act or Regulations to give guidance to 
the courts on how to assess fair value of the minority's shareholding. This will 
provide the courts and the applicants clarity regarding the application of the appraisal 
remedy.120 
In addition to determining the 'fair value' of the shares, the court must also make an 
order: requiring the dissenting shareholders to either withdraw their respective 
demands or take the necessary steps to surrender or transfer their shares to the 
company. Further, the court should require the company to pay the fair value of the 
shares to each dissenting shareholder who takes the necessary steps to surrender 
or transfer the shares to the company, subject to any conditions the court considers 
necessary to ensure that the company fulfils its obligations under section 164.121 
It can be conceded that section 164(15) (c) (v) was poorly drafted because it is 
unclear what 'all of the shareholder's rights in respect of the shares are reinstated 
without interruption' means.122 If a withdrawal of the demand is ordered or chosen, it 
is assumed that the dissident's rights in respect of the shares are reinstated without 
interruption. The reinstatement of rights only occurs if any of the three circumstances 
in section 164(9) arise: first, reinstatement is possible if the demand is withdrawn 
before the offer is made.123 This cannot be possible in the circumstances because 
the offer would have already been made. In order to approach the court, the offer 
must have already been made and not lapsed.124 Secondly, reinstatement is 
possible if the company did not make an offer.125 Similarly, this too would also not 
possible. Thirdly, reinstatement is possible if the resolution is revoked.126 Again, this 
will not be the case because approaching the courts implies that the resolution still 
stands and a fair value is being sought. 
Further, it is not clear whether the dissenting shareholder has a choice to withdraw 
its demand or tender his/her shares and accept the judicially determined fair value 
or, whether it is at the court's discretion to make an order instructing each dissenting 
12° Cassim et al op cit note 7 at 809. 
121 Section 164 (1S)(c)(v). 
122 Section 164(10). 
123 Section 164(9) (a). 
124 Section 164(14). 
125 Section 164(9)(b). 
126 Section 164(9)(c). 
shareholder to withdraw its demand; or alternatively order his/her shares to be 
tendered to the company in exchange for the fair value.127 While the former 
interpretation may seem more literal, the latter view is more logical and 
reasonable. 128 
26 
If this section is read to allow each dissenting shareholder a choice to either 
withdraw his/her demand and be reinstated to his/her full rights or tender his/her 
shares and receive the judicially determined value; it would encourage shareholders 
to dissent from transactions and exercise appraisal rights on a 'no-lose' basis. 
Dissenting shareholders would, thus, be able to withdraw their demand if the 
judicially determined fair value turns out to be less than the fair value that was 
offered by the company but ultimately receive the judicially determined value. 129 
It is submitted that the Delaware model should be followed: a dissenting shareholder, 
who does not withdraw his/her request for appraisal and accepts the offered price, 
will receive the judicially determined 'fair value' .130 It is also worth noting that the 
Canadian Act does not make provision for the lapse of an offer and for the 
reinstatement of the dissidents rights. 
Since the court has a discretion to make an order of costs, having regard to any offer 
made by the company and the final determination of the fair value131 , the order of 
costs against a dissenting shareholder could serve as a deterrent to judicial 
appraisal. 132 It is hoped that when the court makes an order of costs, the court will 
take into account the uncertainty created by the valuation of shares to shareholders; 
as this may often yield unpredictable results, since valuation is not an exact science 
but merely a prediction or an estimate. 133 
Section 164 (15A) gives dissenting shareholders a choice, at any time before the 
court makes a determination of fair value, to accept the company's offer of fair value. 
This is intended to promote settlement; however, it is also susceptible to abuse by 
127 




Ibid at 362. 
130 Ibid. 
131 
Section 164 (15) (c)(iv). 
132 
Cassim et al op cit note 7 at 806. 
133 1bid. 
shareholders.134 Section 164 (15) (c) (iii) (bb) gives the court discretion to permit a 
reasonable rate of interest on the amount payable to the dissenting shareholders, 
from the date that the action was approved by the resolution, is effective until the 
date of payment. The rationale behind this is to compensate the dissenting 
shareholder for the loss of the use of his funds during this period.135 
(h) Court application by company to vary obligations 
27 
Section 164(17) provides that if there are reasonable grounds to believe that 
compliance by a company with subsection (13) (b), or with a court order in terms of 
subsection (15) (c) (v) (bb), would result in the company being unable to pay its 
debts as they fall due and payable for the ensuing 12 months, the company may 
apply to a court for an order varying the company's obligations. The court also has 
the discretion and may make an order that is just and equitable, having regard to the 
financial circumstances of the company, the interests of the minority shareholder; 
and to ensure that the dissenter is paid at the earliest possible date, in relation to the 
company satisfying its other financial obligations when they fall due and payable. 136 
A successful application by the company can have the effect that the amount 
payable by the company and/or the date of payment is varied.137 
Whether the court varies the company's obligations or whether it has to objectively 
determine the fair value of the shares under judicial determination; Beukes submits 
that the agreed amount should be taken into consideration because the acceptance 
of the offer by the dissident a valid contract which exists between the dissident and 
the company which implies that the parties agree that the offer reflects the fair value 
of the shares.138 Beukes position is based on the rationale that when the company 
brings an application for an order varying its obligations in terms of Section 164 (17), 
134 
Cassim et al op cit note 7 at 806. 
135 Ibid. 
136 Section 164 (17) (b) (i) and (ii). 
137 Beukes op cit note 96 at 192. Although there is no specific provision in s 164 to this effect, it can be argued 
that both the agreed amount and the date of payment constitute terms of the company's obligations towards 
a dissenting shareholder and, therefore, that a variation of the company's obligations can include a variation of 
either or both of these terms. 
138 Ibid. 
'the court is merely asked to vary the company's existing obligations in a just and 
equitable way having regard to its financial circumstances'. 139 
28 
In contrast to the Canadian Act140, which permits the approval of the implementation 
of a short-form merger by way of a board resolution of each merging company, the 
South African Companies Act141 does not have any such provision. 
139 Ibid. 
140 
See section 184 of the Canada Business Corporations Act, 1985. 
141 
A short form merger is a simplified form of a merger between a holding company and its wholly-owned 
subsidiary, called a vertical short-form merger, or between two wholly-owned subsidiaries of a holding 
company, known as a horizontal short-form merger, cf Cassim op cit note 7 at 155 & 158. 
V THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE APPRAISAL REMEDY AS A FORM OF 
MINORITY SHAREHOLDER PROTECTION 
29 
Section 164's perfection procedure is critical in determining the effectiveness of the 
appraisal remedy as a form of minority shareholder protection in fundamental 
transactions. A remedy that is efficient, less time consuming would be attractive to 
dissenting shareholders and this would encourage dissidents to seek a fair value of 
their shares.142 
It is submitted that the appraisal procedure under the Act143, has severe procedural 
limitations which tend to curtail its effectiveness as a shareholder protection 
remedy.144 The appraisal remedy procedure is complex and rigid and the procedural 
requirements that have to be fulfilled before the perfection of the appraisal remedy, 
are cumbersome. Thus this makes it difficult for shareholders to invoke the appraisal 
remedy without legal assistance and they are likely to incur legal costs, without the 
guarantee that the appraisal remedy will be available to the shareholder, as the 
requirements may not have been fulfilled. 145 
'The perfection procedure should be viewed as a balancing mechanism (a scale) that 
attempts to balance the liberalisation of fundamental transaction policy, which 
favours the facilitation of efficient business combinations through majority 
shareholder control, against the appraisal remedy's principal purpose of protecting 
minority shareholders from being 'cashed-out' of their investment on unfair terms set 
by the majority' .146 The 'cashing out' of minority shareholders may have the effect of 
draining the company's financial resources; thus the fundamental transaction may 
not be economically viable. 147 The appraisal rights legislation was not originally 
drafted with the objective to create 'cash-out' transactions, existing legislation does 
not fully achieve this purpose.148 It is submitted that currently, the perfection 
142 
Manning op cit note 24 at 230. 
143 Companies Act No 71 of 2008 
144 Cassim op cit note 13 at 164. 
145 Ibid. 




B M Wertheimer 'The Shareholders' Appraisal Remedy and How Courts Determine Fair Value' (1998) 47 
Duke Law Journa/613 at 702. 
procedure does not achieve an appropriate balance between the interests of the 
company and the interests of the minority shareholders, which was the rationale 
behind the appraisal remedy; to protect the interests of the minority shareholder 
while taking into consideration the interests of the company.149 
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It is worth noting that the appraisal procedure is skewed in favour of the company in 
that the latter suffers no similar adverse consequences for non-compliance with its 
complementary procedural obligations.150 If the dissenting shareholder fails to deliver 
to the company both a written notice of objection and a written demand of payment 
within the time frames stipulated in the Act, he/she loses his appraisal remedy.151 On 
the other hand, however, the company suffers no real adverse consequences by its 
failure to make a written offer to pay the fair value of the shares. Nor does it suffer 
any adverse consequences for failing to send a notice of the shareholders meeting 
where the proposed resolution will be considered, without the requisite statement of 
the appraisal remedy and the notice of the adoption of the resolution.152 
The dissenting shareholder is also given a strict period of 30 days after the written 
offer (if any) has been made by the company, within which to apply to court for 
judicial appraisal of the shares.153 
Once a shareholder demands payment for the fair value of the shares in terms of 
section 164 (5), he loses all further rights in respect of those shares, other than to be 
paid their fair value.154 Should the shareholder opt for judicial appraisal, the dissenter 
is not entitled to receive any form of payment from the company up until the court 
has judicially determined the fair value of the shares.155 
This has an adverse effect on the dissenter in that the court may determine the fair 
value of the shares years after the fundamental transaction occurred; this also 
149 
Nicol op cit note 8 at 34. 




In the event of the company's failure to comply with the former requirement, the only consequence is that 
the shareholder is excused from sending a notice of objection to the company (section 164 (6)). Should the 
company fail to send the latter notice (i.e notice of adoption of the resolution), the only consequence is that 
the shareholder's prescribed 20 business day period (within which to deliver a written demand to the 
company) starts to run from the day that the shareholder learns of the adoption of the resolution (section 164 
(7) (b). 
153 






becomes an incentive to the company to delay the process for as long as possible 
with the hope that the dissenter might accept the offer that was initially made by the 
company. 156 Consequently, the shareholder may not afford to finance the appraisal 
litigation, thus becomes compelled to settle for the amount that was offered by the 
company reluctantly instead of pursuing judicial appraisal.157 
Although section 164(15)(c) (iii)(bb) gives the court the discretion to award dissenting 
shareholders who pursue judicial appraisal, a reasonable rate of interest on the fair 
value, from the date that the action is effective until the date of payment; an interest 
award may sufficiently compensate dissenting shareholders for the loss of the use of 
their funds. This however, does not assist their pursuit of judicial appraisal, as it is 
only awarded at the conclusion of the court proceedings. 158 
It is submitted that the Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA) 159 should be 
followed in this regard as it allows a dissenter to receive payment of the amount the 
company deems to be the fair value of the shares very early in the process, whilst 
the court judicially appraises the fair value of the shares, if necessary. Section 
13.24(b) (2) requires that estimate to be at least equal the company's estimate of fair 
value given pursuant to section 13.22(b) (2) (iii). Since all rights as a shareholder are 
terminated with the deposit of the shareholder's shares, as provided for in section 
13.23(a), the former shareholder should have immediate use of the money and a 
difference of opinion over the total amount to be paid should not delay payment of 
the amount that is undisputed.160 
The rationale behind this is that it serves three purposes: a) the undisputed amount 
is paid out to the dissenter so that it may be used to fight the company whilst 
awaiting judicial appraisal of the fair value; b) the amount under dispute is reduced 
when the court judicially appraises the fair value of the shares; c) and if the 
company's estimate of fair value 161 is more than the amount judicially determined by 
156 
Cassim et al op cit note 7 at 808. 
157
M Siegei'An Appraisal of the Model Business Corporation Act's Appraisal Rights Provisions' (2011) 74 Law 
and Contemporary Problems 231 at 236. 
158 Ibid at 806. 
159 
The Model Business Corporation Act, 2008. 
160 
Model Business Corporation Act Annotation§ 13.24 official comment (1999). 
161 
Section 13.24 (b) (2) requires that the corporation's estimate of fair value be at least equivalent to the fair 
value number that the corporation listed on its section 13.22 form. 
the court, the dissenter is under no legal obligation to repay the difference back to 
the company. The effect of this is that, when the company knows that the interim 
payment of fair value could be a loss to it, it will be compelled to be fair when 
estimating the fair value of the shares at the beginning of the process.162 
32 
The costs involved in pursuing the appraisal remedy inhibits its appeal to dissenting 
shareholders because it is a technical procedure that requires experts and attorneys 
to advise the dissident, who is usually a layperson in legal matters. The court has a 
discretion to make an appropriate order of costs, having regard to any offer made by 
the company and the final determination of the fair value by the court.163 Although 
the aim is to encourage the parties to negotiate in good faith and avoid the 
involvement of the court through judicial appraisal, the outcome is usually that the 
dissident may be left out of pocket. The fact that there is no guarantee that the court 
will judicially appraise the fair value of the shares in the dissidents favour, makes 
most dissidents reluctant to go to court and incur costs which might outweigh the 
benefits.164 
Section 13.31 (a) of the MBCA 165 requires the court to determine the court costs of 
the proceeding, including the compensation and expenses of court-appointed 
appraisers against the company. It is assumed that in the absence of conduct that is 
arbitrary or vexatious by dissenting shareholders, the company absorbs the costs of 
the proceedings however, the court is authorised to assess these court costs, in 
whole or in part, against all or some of the shareholders that are seeking judicial 
appraisal and if it concludes that the dissenting shareholders acted arbitrarily or not 
in good faith. 166 The Delaware statute 167 also grants the court the discretion on how 
to allocate costs of the proceedings by stating that: "[t]he costs of the proceeding 
may be determined by the Court and taxed upon the parties as the Court deems 
equitable in the circumstances."168 
However, it must be noted that although both statutes are silent on whether a court 
may assign expert and attorney expenses to an adverse party; Delaware case law 
162 Siegel op cit note 155 at 236. 
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recognises bad faith as an equitable exception to the rule that parties bear their own 
costs for experts and attorneys.169 It is submitted that under South African legislation, 
judicial appraisal costs could be divided in a similar way as under the MBCA or 
Delaware statute and the statutory presumption of costs would give dissenting 
shareholders more concrete assurance as to the allocation of costs; than through the 
discretionary court allocation of the costs. 170 
Under the MBCA, the court also has a discretion to make an order of costs which it 
deems equitable against the company and is in favour of any or all of the 
shareholders, if the company failed to substantially comply with the requirements of 
s13.20 (notification to shareholders of the proposed transaction and the appraisal 
rights available to them); s13.22 (the company providing shareholders with 
information and a form for perfecting appraisal rights); 13.24 (the company paying 
the dissenting shareholders the estimate amount in cash of the fair value for the 
shares plus interest within 30 days) or s13.25 (failure to pay the shareholder in 
cash, the stated fair value plus interest within 10 days after receiving a shareholders 
acceptance). 171 The court may also make an order of costs against the company or a 
shareholder demanding appraisal, if the court finds that the party against whom the 
expenses are assessed acted arbitrarily, vexatiously, or in bad faith. 172 
In an appraisal proceeding, if the court finds that the expenses incurred by any 
dissenting shareholder were of substantial benefit to other shareholders and that 
such expenses should not be assessed against the company. The court may issue 
an order directing that such expenses be paid out of the amounts awarded to the 
shareholders who benefitted. 173 If the company also fails to make the required 
payment pursuant to ss 13.24, 13.25 or 13.26, the shareholder may sue directly for 
the amount owed and shall be entitled to recover from the company all expenses of 
the suit. 174 
In contrast, in South Africa the company does not incur any adverse consequences 
for failure to make an offer to the dissident; but the position is different in the US in 
169 Siegel op cit note 155 at 241. 
170 Ibid at 242. 
171 Section 13.31 (b). 
172 Section 13.31 (b) (2). 
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that the company must, within 60 days after a demand for payment of the fair value 
by the dissenter has been received, effect such payment plus interest.175 Failure by 
the company to commence proceedings for judicial appraisal within this period, 
results in the company being liable to pay the additional amounts demanded by 
dissenters under section 13.26.176 'The purpose of all these grants of discretion with 
respect to expenses is to increase the incentives of both sides to proceed in good 
faith under this chapter, to attempt to resolve their disagreement without the need of 
a formal judicial appraisal of the value of shares' .177 
Another area that needs improvement in South African Company law is with respect 
to the stringent procedures that must be complied with in the perfection of the 
appraisal remedy, as the requirements remain onerous to the dissenting 
shareholder.178 The shareholders are particularly at a disadvantage because the 
company will usually already have access to funds for legal representation and 
proper guidance to comply with the complex procedural requirements.179 Although 
these statutory procedures are intended to notifying the company at an early stage 
as to the number of dissenting shareholders for planning purposes and provide a 
timeframe for the appraisal process to be completed to prevent unnecessary delays; 
penalising shareholders who deviate insignificantly from the mandatory procedures 
defeats the purpose of the appraisal remedy. The MBCA has reduced, but not 
eliminated, the procedural burdens placed on the dissenting shareholders. 
There is reasonable consensus amongst commentators that strict adherence to the 
perfection procedure has deterred dissenters from exercising the appraisal remedy, 
even when there has been no prejudice to the company. 180 It is submitted that 
adopting a statutory 'harmless error rule' or 'substantial compliance defence'; 
whereby minor defects in compliance with procedural requirements of a statute 
would not be fatal to the shareholders appraisal remedy. 
On condition that the company received the dissenter's notice of intention to dissent 
before the transaction was voted on and there is no substantial prejudice that the 
175 Section 13.30. 
176 
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company incurs. This would make the appraisal remedy more effective. 181 It is hoped 
that the court will interpret the dissenting shareholders procedural obligations with 
leniency and flexibility so as to excuse shareholders who make genuine attempts but 
still fail to comply strictly with the prescribed procedure and time periods.1 82 
It is worthy to note that the judicial determination of the fair value of shares does not 
follow a set procedure but rather is merely a prediction or estimate. This creates 
uncertainty and a substantial risk that the shareholder's estimate of the fair value of 
the shares may be higher than the valuation made by the court. 183 The wording in 
the Act184 states that the court must determine 'a' fair value and not 'the' fair value; 
this suggests/implies that that the fair value could be a range of values and not a 
particular figure. In as much as the court has discretion to allocate costs185 , the 
uncertainty as to the valuation of the shares may discourage dissenting shareholders 
from pursuing judicial appraisal. It is submitted that the Act should explicitly state that 
the order of costs will be for the company's account and the court must be given 
further discretion to allocate expert and statutory costs where either party acts in bad 
faith during the negotiations.186 This will be a deterrent and will encourage the parties 
to negotiate in good faith. 
The statutory presumption has the effect of making judicial appraisal more 
economically feasible for the dissenting shareholder as opposed to the present 
discretionary nature of the allocation of costs under the Act; which would make 
judicial appraisal more attractive to dissenting shareholders. 187 'Supporters of judicial 
appraisal have argued that if absent some substantial financial relief, appraisal rights 
are merely a theoretical right for those who own only a small number of shares' .1 88 
In conclusion, it must be stated that the South African legislature drafted a 
cumbersome procedure that requires perfection of its requirements for it to be 
181 
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effective; thus the scales are tipped in favour of the majority shareholders as the 
perfection procedure is complex, technical, time consuming and costly for minority 
shareholders to pursue. It essentially fails to strike a balance between the interests 
of the majority and the interests of the minority shareholders, which further detracts 
from the shareholder protection rationale underlying the appraisal remedy. The 
above stated recommendations can assist in striking a balance between the interests 
of the majority and minority shareholders through the simplification of the perfection 
procedure and requirements. Further, the simplification of the process for the 
appraisal remedy will facilitate of efficient business combinations through majority 
rule on the one hand and protecting minority shareholders on the other. 
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OTHER FORMS OF PROTECTION AVAILABLE TO MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS 
IN SOUTH AFRICA 
It must be noted that the appraisal remedy forms part of a broader approval process 
and if viewed in its entirety, the appraisal remedy is the last but one step in the 
implementation process of certain transactions. 189 
Section 115 states that despite the amendment of the company's Memorandum of 
Incorporation or any resolution adopted by the board, a company may not dispose of 
all or greater of its assets or undertaking, implement an amalgamation or a merger, 
or enter into a scheme of arrangement unless the proposed transaction is approved 
by a special resolution supported by at least 75 per cent of the persons entitled to 
exercise voting rights. 19° Furthermore, section 115(4) provides that any voting rights 
controlled by an acquiring party, a person related to an acquiring party or a person 
acting in concert with either of them must not be included in calculating the 
percentage of voting rights in support of the resolution. 191 
For the proposed transaction to be binding on the shareholders, the meeting called 
for that purpose must be attended by at least 25% of all persons entitled to exercise 
voting rights, a higher percentage may be required as per the company's 
Memorandum of lncorporation. 192 It is worth noting that the voting rights controlled by 
an acquiring party, a person related to an acquiring party or a person acting in 
concert with either of them, must not be included in calculating the percentage of 
voting rights required to be present in determining whether the applicable quorum 
requirements have been met.193 
Even after the resolution has been approved, the company may not proceed to 
implement that resolution without court approval, if the resolution was opposed by at 
least 15% of the voting rights. Further, the company may not implement the 
resolution within 5 business days after approval of the resolution as any person who 
189 
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190 Section 115(1) read with section 115(2)(a). 
191 
See section 2(1) definition of 'related' to determine who is 'related' to an acquiring party. 
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voted against it, may require the company to seek court approval.194 In addition, a 
shareholder who voted against the resolution may make an application to court for 
leave to review the transaction within 10 business days after the resolution was 
approved. 195 
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Additional protection mechanisms apply, specifically, to schemes of arrangements 196 
whereby the company must retain a qualified independent expert to compile a report 
to the board; the report must also be distributed to the shareholders so that they are 
fully aware of the details of the scheme and its effects on their shares, prior to voting 
on the resolution. 
Furthermore, the 'majority of the minority' approval requirement protects minority 
shareholders in circumstances where the transaction is not conducted on an arms-
length basis and where the acquirer is able to exert influence on the disposer.197 
In practice, the question is, how effective is the remedy afforded to a shareholder to 
approach a court for judicial review of a transaction? Firstly, the general grounds on 
which a court may review and set aside a resolution are limited to the transaction, 
not merely being unfair but manifest unfairness and procedural irregularity which 
must materially taint the transaction. 198 A second limitation to the protection 
mechanisms that have been discussed are the cost implications that shareholders 
have to incur to institute court proceedings; this may act as a deterrent.199 It must be 
noted that the review remedy is only available to shareholders who voted against the 
resolution and not those who were not opposed to it; regardless of whether they 
suffer material loss or harm as a result of the transaction.200 
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VI MINORITY SHAREHOLDER PROTECTION IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
In its most basic form minority shareholder protection refers to principles or 
measures that protect minority shareholders' rights against the abuse of power by 
majority shareholders. Especially with companies that are small or medium-sized 
entities, owned by a small number of shareholders who in most cases also run the 
businesses as directors. Typically businesses start out as being controlled by family 
or friends through consensus and with little compliance with the formalities imposed 
by company law legislation. If the relationship upon which the business was run, 
breaks down and the shareholder with majority shareholding decides to operate the 
business as his own or to vote the minority shareholders out as directors, what 
recourse would the minority shareholders have in these instances?201 
The general principle is that a company is managed by its directors and not its 
shareholders thus a decision made by a majority of shareholders in a general 
meeting is binding on the minority.202 In order to address the imbalance of power 
between the majority and minority shareholders and to secure the protection of 
minority shareholders, there are a number of protection mechanisms afforded to 
minority shareholders, contained mainly in the Companies Act.203 
A brief overview of minority shareholder protection in the United Kingdom and the 
remedies available to minority shareholders will be discussed below. 
(a) Unfair Prejudice 
Section 994 of the United Kingdom Companies Act of 2006 (formerly section 459 of 
the Companies Act 1985) is the most important protection device afforded to 
minority shareholders in the UK; it gives minority shareholders the right to petition a 
court for an order protecting the shareholder(s) from unfair prejudice. The right to 
petition the court is founded on the allegation that the affairs of the company are 
being conducted by the majority in a manner that is prejudicial to the interests of the 
201 
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members generally, or to some part of its members204; or that an actual or proposed 
act or omission of the company (including an act or omission on its behalf) is or 
would be prejudicial to the minority shareholder (s).205 This includes a breach of a 
legal bargain between the shareholders, for example a Shareholders Agreement or 
Articles of Association; breach of fiduciary duty; breach of an equitable agreement or 
understanding; or breach of quasi-partnership principles.2062 
The remedy that is most often sought under a Section 994 Petition is that the other 
shareholders buy their shares for a fair value: however, it is important to note that the 
Court has complete discretion as to who should purchase the shares and if the 
circumstances warrant, the court can even order the minority shareholder to 
purchase the shares of the majority.207 
The court also has the discretion to make orders to adjust the unfair prejudice that 
the minority shareholder has suffered. For example, the court may order the 
company to be valued on the basis of the benefits taken by director/shareholders in 
breach of fiduciary duty, to be repaid.208 The court will also decide at what date the 
company should be valued and whether there should be any discount to reflect the 
minority shareholding.209 The court can also make an order regulating the conduct of 
the company's affairs in the future; require the company to do or refrain from any act 
and authorise civil proceedings to be brought in the name of the company.210 
(b) Derivative Claims 
'In many circumstances, a minority shareholder may be affected by a wrong done, 
not to him personally but to the company by the majority. For example, diversion of 
contracts from the company to the directors personally. The minority shareholder 
faces an impossible task in attempting to force directors into bringing an action 
against themselves. In certain circumstances, however, the Courts will allow a 
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minority shareholder to bring a claim in the company's name and the minority 
shareholder has no greater right to relief than the company would have were it to 
bring an action itself.211 Unlike the prejudice petition, any financial award granted 
accrues to the company itself. 
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Such "derivative claims" were formerly governed by the common law and were rarely 
brought to the courts. However, the Companies Act212 has given shareholders an 
important minority shareholder protection remedy, as it purports to shield 
shareholders from the effects of corporate personality and majority rule213 through a 
statutory derivative claim under section 260. This section affords minority 
shareholders the right to bring a derivative claim; which replaces the common law 
exceptions to the rule, as decided in Foss v Harbottle214 that shareholders previously 
had to rely on that the proper plaintiff to a wrong done to the company is the 
company itself. Section 260(3) provides that a derivative claim may be brought only 
in respect of a cause of action arising from an actual or a proposed act or omission 
involving negligence, default, breach of duty, or breach of trust by a director of the 
company. It is worth noting that a shareholder-director responsible for the negligent 
act will not be able to vote at a meeting of members called to ratify the act or 
omission.215 
It must also be noted that unlike the South African statutory derivate action under 
section 165216; which is wider, extends its reach beyond instances of wrongdoer 
control of the company, is available to a wider class of applicants than just minority 
shareholders217; the UK statutory derivate action under section 260 is limited in that 
the action can only be instituted by a shareholder of the company. 
Derivative actions are expensive and time consuming for all the parties involved and 
a decision to bring a derivative claim is not one that should be taken lightly due to the 
amount of evidence that will be required, to support such a claim. 
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(c) Personal Claims 
All shareholders have rights that can be enforced against the company and other 
shareholders, whether or not a formal shareholder's agreement has been reached; 
and these include objections to the alteration of the Memorandum and Articles of 
Association, the variation of class rights, the giving of financial assistance and the 
enforcement of directors' duties, prevention of ultra vires transactions and in relation 
to certain take-over offers.218 
The Memorandum and Articles of Association represent a statutory agreement 
between the shareholders and the company as to how the company is to be run and 
the court will enforce a breach of that agreement.219 An otherwise proper attempt to 
vary the articles can be actionable if it affects rights already in existence or if the 
majority has not acted in good faith.220 
(d) Just and Equitable Winding-Up 
As a last resort, the court has the power to wind up the company on 'just and 
equitable grounds'. 221 The burden of proof rests with the applicant to demonstrate 
that the circumstances warrant intervention (such as the exclusion of a minority 
shareholder from management). Moreover, as an equitable remedy, this will only be 
granted if the applicant who is seeking it has had no part in the matters that he 
complains of (this is called coming to the court with 'clean hands').222 Further, such 
an order is only made on this type of application where there will be enough funds, 
following the payment of any company debts, to distribute amongst the shareholders 
once the company has been wound up.223 
In conclusion, despite the fact that the UK has conducted three wholesale reviews of 
its company's law in 1895, 1989 and 1986, the provisions of both the old and new 
Company Acts seem to lack adequate enforcement mechanisms, to afford sufficient 
protection to minority shareholders. Whilst on the other hand, South Africa has 
218 
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introduced a regime that is more efficient and effective in a number of ways. It is 
submitted that the UK should consider introducing appraisal rights as a form of 
minority protection based on best practice from jurisdictions such as South Africa, 
the United States and Canada. 
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VII MINORITY SHAREHOLDER PROTECTION IN SWAZILAND 
Swaziland has a dual-legal system comprising Roman-Dutch law and customary law; 
and most investments are effected and governed by Roman-Dutch law and the 
judicial system generally upholds the sanctity of contracts. However, companies 
investing under the auspices of Swazi tradition and custom do not have the same 
judicial protections and remedies, as investments under the more commonly used 
Roman-Dutch law. 
The company law in Swaziland is based on pieces of legislation from other 
jurisdictions namely, the United Kingdom as a result of being a former British colony; 
thus has inherited the English legal system as well as South Africa which has a 
mixed legal system which comprises of Roman-Dutch law and English law. The 
Companies Act of 2009, which replaced the outdated Companies Act of 1912, came 
into force on 1 April 2010. Its main objective is to streamline the establishment, 
incorporation and registration of companies as well as improve the management, 
administration and dissolution of companies; and put Swaziland's corporate laws in 
line with regional and international developments. 
Traditionally, the governance of companies is based on the principle of majority rule 
which means that the minority shareholder has to submit to the will of the majority 
and only where decisions amounted to oppressive behaviour is a minority 
shareholder protected.224 Despite the principle of majority rule remaining an 
entrenched part in common law, new principles and regulations are gradually giving 
minority shareholders greater powers within companies. 225 
In addition to the principle of majority rule, a further principle of company law is that if 
a company has been wronged, it must itself act to have the wrong redressed.226 This 
principle is connected to the separate legal entity of a company.227 1t is important to 
224 
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note that it is highly improbable for the company to act in its own name, especially if 
the wrongdoers themselves are in control of the company. 
Common law provides for two types o~ actions that minority shareholders can take to 
ascertain their rights, these are Derivative Action and Personal action; the choice of 
which action to use is dependent on the wrong done and the circumstances 
surrounding the wrong. In Swaziland, the derivative action of the common law has 
received little attention. 
(a) Derivative Action 
Minority shareholder protection under common law is centred on the famous case of 
Foss v Harbottle228; where the court held that the proper plaintiff in an action for a 
wrong done to the company is the company itself; this principle is known as the rule 
in Foss v Harbottle.229 This rule is based on the principle that a company has a 
separate legal personality to its shareholders and the majority rule. The effect of this 
judgment is that it rendered minority shareholders virtually powerless, if the acts 
complained off against the company were condoned by the majority230 because the 
minority shareholders were bound by the majority resolution and could not institute 
action against the wrongdoer. 
It is the board of directors that has the authority to institute action in the name of or 
on behalf of the company. 231 The question that arises is what if a wrong to the 
company directly affects a shareholder? The strict operation of the rule in Foss v 
Harbottle would prevent a minority shareholder from protecting his/her interest. The 
common law exception to this rule is that shareholders may intervene and institute 
228 
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action (derivative action) on behalf of the company where the board refuses or is 
unable to do so.232 
46 
The common law derivative action principle was developed in circumstances where 
those who commit a wrong against the company, for instance the company is 
defrauded by its directors, are also the majority shareholders and subsequently use 
their majority to prevent the company from instituting action to remedy the wrong 
done to the company.233 The plaintiff must join the company as a nominal defendant, 
making it a party to the proceedings; hence the order made becomes applicable to it. 
The applicant is personally liable for the legal costs involved in instituting the action 
and if successful, any benefit from the proceedings accrues to the company not to 
him personally. This may make members reluctant to institute proceedings.234 
(b) Personal action 
In the shareholders capacity as a member of the company, the personal action 
remedy grants the member the right to institute action against the company on 
his/her own behalf, as well as on behalf of the other members of the company in the 
following instances:235 (a) if there has been a breach of the rights of the member as 
they are protected under the memorandum or articles; (b) where there has been 
illegal conduct and conduct that is in breach of the common law which related to the 
member's, membership rights and which cannot be ratified by an ordinary resolution; 
(c) where there has been fraud on the minority and in addition to normal fraud, this 
also relates to the abuse of power by the majority. 
Expecting minority shareholders under common law, who usually don't have access 
to vital information of the internal dealings of the company, to assert the rights of the 
company at their own cost by way of derivative action; is somewhat impractical236 
and one of the reasons the legislature in Swaziland amended this piece of legislation 
to provide for statutory derivative action in the Companies Act.237 
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Nowadays, in most instances, minority shareholders prefer to rely on statutory 
minority shareholder protection as enshrined in the Companies Act238 • This will be 
discussed in further detail below. 
(a) Statutory Derivative Action 
47 
Section 228 of the Companies Act239 facilitates the institution of proceedings on 
behalf of a company, by a member, against a director or officer or past director or 
officer of that company where a company has suffered damages or loss, or has been 
deprived of any benefit as a result of any wrong, breach of trust or breach of faith 
committed by any director or officer of that company or by any past director or officer 
while he was a director or officer of that company and the company has not instituted 
proceedings for the recovery of such damages, loss or benefit.240 The member must 
first serve a written notice on the company, calling on it to initiate such proceedings 
within one month from the date of service, failing which, he/she shall initiate the 
proceedings.241 
Should the company fail to initiate the proceedings within the said period, the 
member may make an application to the court for an order appointing a curator ad 
litem to institute and conduct the proceedings on behalf of the company, against 
such director or officer or past director or officer.242 If the court is satisfied that the 
company has refused or failed to institute the proceedings; there are prima facie 
grounds for such proceedings. If the investigation into the grounds and the 
desirability of the institution of such proceedings is justified, the court may appoint a 
provisional curator ad litem and direct him/her to conduct the investigation and report 
to the court on the return day of the provisional order.243 On the return day, the court 
may discharge the provisional order, or confirm the appointment of the curator ad 
litem; as the court may deem necessary and may order that any resolution ratifying 
238 
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or condoning the wrong, breach of trust or breach of faith or any act or omission in 
relation thereto shall not be of any force or effect. 244 
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The basis for instituting this type of action is that, if it can be proved that the 
company has suffered any damages or loss or has been deprived any benefit owing 
to a wrong, breach of trust or faith committed by a current or present director or 
officer and it failed to institute proceedings against that director or officer; a 
provisional curator who reports his findings to the court will be appointed. If the court 
is satisfied with the findings, it will appoint a curator ad litem who will institute 
proceedings on behalf of the company against the wrongdoers.245 
The introduction of statutory derivative action by the legislature does provide some 
form of protection to minority shareholders in that the court may order the company 
to pay the costs of the proceedings, where it is established that the institution of the 
action by the applicant was a reasonable and prudent course to take, in the interests 
of the company.246 In addition, the proceedings can be instituted despite that the 
wrong is rectifiable247 and the appointment of a curator ad litem will provide more 
information as, he/she has investigative powers. 248 
The shortcomings of this section, is that it is only applicable to wrongs in which the 
company has suffered; in the form of damages, loss or if it has been deprived of a 
benefif49; thus wrongs that have been inflicted on members or minority shareholders 
are not covered by this protection mechanism. It is worth noting that only certain 
types of wrongs are included under the section250 and members must resort to 
common law derivate action to assert their rights, in instances where the wrong is 
not covered by the Act and this action is only available if the company has not 
instituted proceedings against the wrongdoers. It is also important to note that 
proceedings can be initiated even if the company has passed a resolution ratifying or 
244 Section 228(4). 
245 
AT Adebango Remedies for Dissenting Shareholders: A Comparison of the Current Option of Personal Action 
and the Proposed Appraisal Remedy under the Companies Bill of 2008 (Unpublished LLM thesis, University of 
South Africa, 2008) 9. 
246 Section 230. 
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Ibid and include breach of trust or breach of faith or any wrong. 
condoning the wrong, breach of trust or breach of faith or any act or omission in 
relation thereto. 251 
(b) Appointment of Inspectors 
49 
Section 219 provides that when the members apply to the Minister for the inspection 
of the company's affairs. The Minister may appoint an inspector or inspectors to 
investigate the affairs of the company and report thereon in such a manner as 
he/she may direct, under these circumstances: (a) in the case of a company limited 
by shares, on the application of not less than one-hundreth members or of members 
holding not less than one-twentieth of the shares issued252; and (b) in the case of a 
company limited by guarantee on the application of not less than one-tenth of the 
number of persons on the register of members.253 The application to the Minister 
must be supported by evidence as the Minister may require evidence/ proof that the 
applicants have good reason or are justified in desiring an inspection.254 The Minister 
also has a discretion whether or not to require the applicants to give security to 
his/her satisfaction, for an amount not exceeding four hundred emalangeni towards 
the cost of the investigation.255 
The Minister may also appoint an inspector or inspectors to investigate the affairs of 
the company if it appears to him that there are circumstances suggesting; (a) that the 
business of the company is being conducted with intent to defraud its creditors or the 
creditors of any other person or otherwise for a fraudulent or an unlawful purpose or 
in a manner unfairly prejudicial or unjust or inequitable to any part of its members or 
that it was formed for any fraudulent or unlawful purpose;256 or (b) that the persons 
concerned with its formation or the management of its affairs have in connection 
therewith been guilty of any fraud, delict or other misconduct towards it or toward its 
251 Section 228(4). 
252 Section 219(1)(a). 
253 Section 219(1)(b). 
254 Section 219(2). 
255 Ibid. 
256 Section 220(2)(a). 
members;257 or (c) that its members have not been given all the information with 
respect to its affairs, which they might reasonably expect.258 
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Although section 220 may seem to provide some form of protection for minority 
shareholders, in practice this section plays a limited role in protecting minority 
shareholders; as there have been no reported cases in Swaziland where this section 
has been invoked. 
(c) Members remedy in case of unfairly prejudicial conduct 
Section 214 provides that any member of a company who complains that any 
particular act or omission of a company is unfairly prejudicial, unjust or inequitable, 
or that the affairs of the company are being conducted in a manner unfairly 
prejudicial, unjust or inequitable to him or some part of the members of the company; 
may make an application to the court for an order259 where the act complained of 
relates to; (a) any alteration of the memorandum of the company under section 46 or 
47;260 (b) any reduction of the capital of the company under section 69;261 (c) any 
variation of rights in respect of shares of a company under section 86262; or (d) a 
conversion of a private company into a public company or of a public company into a 
private company under section 19.263 
This remedy is designed to provide relief to oppressed shareholders without 
necessarily overruling the majority rule principle. However, the section does not 
abolish the common law personal action remedy that can be invoked by minority 
shareholders. 
Once an application has been brought before the court and it appears to the court 
that the particular act or omission is unfairly prejudicial, unjust or inequitable or that 
the company's affairs are conducted with fraudulent intent, and if the court considers 
it is just and equitable, it may with a view of bringing to an end the matters 
257 Section 220(2)(b). 
258 Section 220(2)(c). 
259 Section 214(1). 
260 Section 214(2)(a). 
261 Section 214(2)(b). 
262 
Section 214(2)(c). 
263 Section 214(2)(d). 
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complained off make such an order as it deems fit.264 However, this remedy is only 
available to formally registered members of the company and the application to court 
has to be made within six weeks after the date of the passing of the relevant special 
resolution required, with regards to the particular act.265 
(d) Power to acquire shares of minority in a take-over scheme. 
Where a take-over has been made through a scheme or contract, that involved the 
transfer of shares or any class of shares of a company to an offereor, within four 
months after the offer was made and the offeror received no less than 90% of the 
shareholders' approval; the offeror may within two months after the acceptance, give 
notice to any shareholder who has not accepted the said offer of the desire to 
acquire his shares on the same terms as the offer accepted by the other 
shareholders. The shareholder who has not accepted the offer, can within 6 weeks 
of such notice approach the court which has the discretion to make an order it 
deems fit. If no application is made within the said period, the offeror is bound to 
acquire those shares of the shareholders who have not accepted the offer.266 
Where a notice has been given by the offeror to the court on an application made by 
a shareholder who has not accepted the offer, has not ordered to the contrary, the 
offeror shall, on the expiration of 6 weeks from the date on which the notice was 
given, or, if an application to the court by such shareholder is then pending, after the 
application has been disposed of, transmit a copy of the notice to the offeree 
company. The notice to the offeree company must be accompanied by an instrument 
of transfer executed on behalf of such shareholder by any person appointed by the 
offeror and pay or transfer to the offeree company the amount or other consideration 
representing the price payable by the offeror for the shares which he or it is entitled 
to acquire, the offeree company shall thereupon register the offeror as the holder of 
264 
Section 214(3) whether for regulating the future conduct of the company's affairs or for the purchase of the 
shares of any members of the company by other members thereof or by the company and, in the case of a 
purchase by the company, for the reduction accordingly of the company's capital, or otherwise. 
265 Section 214(2). 
266 Section 268(1). 
those shares; provided that an instrument of transfer shall not be required for any 
share for which a share warrant is for the time being outstanding. 267 
52 
In this instance, a minority shareholder who dissents can be bought out if 90% of the 
shareholders voted for and accepted the offer from the offeror. This thereby means 
that in a take-over, minority shareholders who dissent, only have recourse to the 
courts which has the discretion to issue an order that it may deem fit. If the court 
issues an order against the minority shareholder, the offeror is entitled to acquire the 
minority shareholders' shares and thus the minority shareholder will not be afforded 
an opportunity of becoming an investor and holder of shares in the new company. 
The possible remedies that Swaziland Company law can adopt to improve minority 
shareholder protection, in an attempt to strike a balance between protecting the 
interests of the majority shareholders and that of minority shareholders will be 
discussed below. 
(a) Adoption of Donohue approach (heightened fiduciary duty) 
One remedy that can be incorporated in Swaziland's Company law to improve 
minority shareholder protection, is the Donahue approach (Heightened fiduciary 
duty). This approach basically states that all shareholders owe each other a strict 
duty of the utmost loyalty and good faith. This approach has been supported by 
many cases in a number of foreign jurisdictions. 
The leading case for this approach is the case of Donahue v. Rodd Electrotupe Co. 
of Newingland Jnc.268 In this case the court held that 'Stockholders in a close 
corporation owe one another substantially the same fiduciary duty in the operation of 
the enterprise that partners owe to one another, namely, a duty of the utmost good 
faith and loyalty.269 Just as in a partnership, the relationship among the stockholders 





328 N.E.2D 505 (1975). 
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This principle was also reaffirmed in the case of Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, 
lnc.271 , where it was held that stockholders in a close corporation owe one another 
the duty of utmost good faith and loyalty. 
The Donohue approach has been prevalent in most states across the US and it is 
submitted that Swaziland is considering adopting this approach as a means to better 
protect minority shareholding. The use of this approach should be applied with 
consideration of the type of entity, as shareholders publicly held corporation have 
different expectations from the shareholders in closely held corporations. As such it 
is important when granting appropriate remedies in relation to the Donahue 
approach, to consider the different expectations of the shareholders.272 
(b) Exit Mechanism 
Another possible improvement to the current minority shareholder protection in 
Swaziland, is the set-up of an exit mechanism. Currently, under the Swaziland 
company law, there is no provision that compels the majority to buy out the minority 
shareholders in instances where a resolution is adopted but is potentially detrimental 
to the minority shareholders. Swaziland should consider adopting the appraisal 
remedy that has been adopted by South Africa, however it would be highly 
recommended to incorporate best practice from Delaware and Canada; as this would 
make the perfection procedure of the appraisal remedy more simplistic. This would 
ensure that the balance is struck between the protection of majority and minority 
shareholders and minority shareholders are afforded a 'way out' of the company. 
In order to prevent companies from being held ransom by minority shareholders who 
want to make a quick profit and stifle the growth of the company, it is suggested that 
when a minority shareholder can force the majority to buy its shares, for example in 
instances where the decision adopted by the majority shareholders amounts to gross 
oppression of the minority shareholders. 
271 
(370) Mass.842, 253 N.E.2d.657 [1976]. 





Historically, it has been shown that the appraisal remedy has served and continues 
to afford minority shareholders who enter into fundamental transactions, the 
necessary protection that they require. In the South African company law context, 
the Act has considerably liberalised fundamental transactions policy in its effort to 
grow the economy through efficient facilitation of majority approved business 
combinations. Although the perfection procedure in South Africa is complex, 
technical, time consuming and costly for minority shareholders; the best practice on 
how to simplify the perfection procedure from jurisdictions such as the US and 
Canada would be helpful in this regard. 
With regards to Swaziland's Company law, there is a need for increased minority 
shareholder protection and a need for an amendment to the Act to include an 
appraisal remedy that better protects minority shareholders; especially with regards 
to fundamental transactions. However, this recommendation does not suggest that a 
wholesome transplant of the Company laws from other jurisdictions should be done, 
rather, best practice of the appraisal remedy from these jurisdictions should be 
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